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The International Competition Network:  
Its Past, Current and Future Role 
Hugh M. Hollman* & William E. Kovacic** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION*** 
In October 2001, on the occasion of Fordham Law School’s 
annual international antitrust conference in New York City, 
fourteen competition agencies announced the creation of the 
International Competition Network (ICN).1 The new venture 
joined a field of multinational competition networks that 
already included the Competition Law and Policy Committee 
(CLPC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the Competition Law and Consumer 
Policies Branch of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), and an initiative under the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) to explore the preparation of an 
international system of competition law standards.2 Given the 
scope of the existing networks and the effort needed to support 
them (most ICN founders also participated in the OECD, 
 
* Hugh M. Hollman is Attorney Advisor to Commissioner Kovacic at the 
Federal Trade Commission, and a member of the ICN’s Agency Effectiveness 
Working Group. 
** William E. Kovacic is a Commissioner at the US Federal Trade 
Commission, Professor, George Washington University Law School (on leave), 
and Vice Chair for Outreach of the ICN.  
*** The authors would like to thank Rebecca Bianchi for her invaluable 
research assistance We received generous guidance from Russell Damtoft, 
Elizabeth Kraus, Randy Tritell, and Maria Coppola. We also have benefitted 
from conversations with Sean Ennis, John Fingleton, Hillary Jennings, 
Frederic Jenny, Joe Phillips, Hassan Qaqaya, Ulla Schweger, and Jeremy 
West. The views expressed are the authors’ alone and not those of the Federal 
Trade Commission, any individual Commissioner, or the ICN.  
 1. U.S. and Foreign Antitrust Officials Launch International Competition 
Network (Oct. 25, 2001), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/10/icn.shtm. 
 2. See Int’l Competition Policy Advisory Comm. to the Attorney General: 
Antitrust Div., FINAL REPORT 281–302 (2000) [hereinafter ICPAC REPORT], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm (discussing what 
a new international network of competition agencies could add to work already 
performed by existing bodies). 
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UNCTAD, and WTO programs), it was reasonable to wonder 
whether the undertaking would be sustainable. 
In major respects, the new network not only has survived 
but prospered. Today, as its tenth anniversary approaches, the 
ICN’s membership has grown to 114 members, which 
collectively represent nearly all of the world’s jurisdictions with 
competition laws.3 The organization’s efforts have yielded 
important contributions to the development of widely accepted 
international competition policy norms,4 and its annual 
meeting has become perhaps the single most important annual 
gathering of competition agency leaders. More broadly, the ICN 
exemplifies the form of voluntary multinational collaboration 
that commentators have identified as a promising way to 
facilitate international ordering amid the global 
decentralization and diversification of economic regulation.5 
The arrival of ICN’s tenth anniversary offers an 
appropriate juncture to take stock of ICN’s achievements, to 
consider why the ICN has succeeded thus far in many of its 
aims, and to ask what comes next. In general, the ICN’s 
paramount goal is to facilitate convergence on superior 
approaches concerning the substance, procedure, and 
administration of competition law. To achieve this aim, the ICN 
engages in projects that seek to (1) increase understanding of 
individual competition systems, including similarities and 
 
 3. Interview with John Fingleton, Chair of the Steering Group of the 
International Competition Network (ICN), 25 ANTITRUST 71 (2010) 
[hereinafter Fingleton Interview] (reviewing ICN membership data). ICN 
membership is available to national competition agencies. Thus, some 
jurisdictions with multiple agencies have more than one representative in the 
ICN. For example, the US Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust 
Division of the US Department of Justice are both ICN members, as are the 
Competition Commission and the Office of Fair Trading from the United 
Kingdom. The most notable jurisdiction with a competition law and no 
representation in the ICN is China, which has three national competition 
agencies (MOFCOM, NDRC, and SAIC). China participates in the work of the 
OECD Competition Committee as an observer and is a member of UNCTAD. 
The Chinese agencies have not discussed their intentions concerning ICN 
membership. As mentioned below, see infra text accompanying note 113, 
China’s participation in the ICN is an important determinant of the 
organization’s future success. 
 4. See Int’l Competition Network, ICN WORK PRODUCTS CATALOGUE 
(Sept. 2010) [hereinafter ICN WORK PRODUCTS] available at 
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc667.pdf. 
 5. For the best known work advancing this theme, see generallyANNE-
MARIE SLAUGHTER, THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). For a useful review of the 
future path for these international endeavors, see David Ziring, Three 
Challenges for Regulatory Networks, 43 INT’L LAWYER 211 (2009). 
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differences among them, (2) identify and build consensus about 
superior practices, and (3) encourage individual jurisdictions to 
opt in to superior techniques. Other international networks 
make useful contributions toward convergence, but the ICN 
prides itself on having a stronger capacity to promote broad 
adoption of global standards.  
The ICN pursues convergence with the expectation that if 
competition systems around the world opt in to superior 
techniques, they will achieve greater progress toward 
dismantling competitive restraints within single jurisdictions 
and across borders. In a number of areas, the ICN’s effort to 
encourage greater convergence upon substantive norms, 
procedural standards, and operational techniques seems to 
have achieved its aims. To put the point cautiously, we have 
seen growth in the number of competition policy systems that 
embody the ICN’s Recommended Best Practices.6 However, the 
full extent of adherence to the network’s recommended 
practices remains unclear.  
In this Article we consider what comes next for the ICN. 
Where can it make the greatest contribution to the 
development of sensible international competition policy 
standards? Can the ICN be effective if it continues to exist in 
its current form as a purely virtual network, or will the 
institution acquire more of the attributes—for example, a 
formal, stand-alone secretariat—that one associates with older, 
intergovernmental organizations such as OECD and UNCTAD? 
How can the ICN best serve a large, diverse membership that 
features extensive variation with respect to national 
circumstances and experience with competition law? Could the 
ICN perhaps serve as the platform for the development of 
regional or multinational agreements? How should the ICN 
interact with the OECD, UNCTAD, and other multinational 
bodies involved in competition policy? And, perhaps most 
ambitiously, can the ICN facilitate progress toward the 
establishment of a mechanism for the application of 
international competition law, including dispute resolution? 
Our examination of the ICN’s experience and our attempts to 
 
 6. Int’l Competition Network, A STATEMENT OF ACHIEVEMENTS 
THROUGH APRIL 2010, 3–4 (Apr. 2010) (discussing impact of ICN’s merger-
related recommended practices), available at www.internationalcompetitionne
twork.org/uploads/library/doc630.pdf [hereinafter STATEMENT OF 
ACHIEVEMENTS]; see, e.g., ICN WORK PRODUCTS, supra note 4, at 10 (setting 
out recommended practices developed by ICN’s Merger Working Group). 
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answer these questions may assist other international 
networks of public bodies in deciding how to carry out programs 
in other fields of policy.  
The ICN’s current leadership is engaged in an intensive 
examination of the network’s future.7 We seek to inform 
discussion about the ICN’s future by offering a way to think of 
its institutional characteristics, to assess its relative 
advantages by comparison to other multinational competition 
networks, and by proposing specific steps for the organization 
to consider going ahead. In our view, the challenges for the ICN 
and its members are to preserve institutional attributes that 
have worked well, to achieve a fuller integration of effort with 
the OECD and UNCTAD, to strengthen the network’s capacity 
to identify and serve its members’ needs, and to continue to set 
a foundation that could support the development of a system of 
global competition rules. 
All of what we suggest must be accomplished amid extreme 
pressure upon agencies to reduce costs. The expansion of 
competition policy systems creates a special urgency to make 
these and similar investments that build an effective 
framework of international standards and cooperation, yet 
these infrastructure-like expenditures often are the first to go 
amid demands to curb public budgets.  
To consider a course for the ICN’s second decade, we focus 
mainly on the development and operation of the network since 
its creation in October 2001. In doing so, we write from the 
perspective of a government agency (the US Federal Trade 
Commission) that was one of the network’s fourteen founding 
members and has participated actively in the design of the 
network’s programs and processes. We sketch the ICN’s 
origins, but we emphasize experience with implementation. It 
required true foresight over a decade ago to see the value of 
creating another multinational initiative to address policy 
concerns that already commanded the attention of the OECD, 
UNCTAD, and the WTO. Once the commitment to form the 
ICN was made in 2000–01, it was not inevitable that it would 
emerge as a useful instrument to improve global competition 
policy. Following the launch, skillful implementation counted 
for everything. Experience with the ICN’s development since 
October 2001 supplies important lessons about the network’s 
future.  
 
 7. See infra note 15 and accompanying text (describing ICN Second 
Decade initiative). 
KOVACIC - Final Version 4/22/20116:19 PM 
278 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 20:2 
 
II. CONVERGENCE: MEANING AND METHODS 
To provide context for studying the ICN’s experience, we 
first define “convergence”—the main objective that motivated 
the ICN’s creation and sustains its operations today. By 
convergence we mean the broad acceptance of standards 
concerning the substantive doctrine and analytical methods of 
competition law, the procedures for applying substantive 
commands, and the methods for administering a competition 
agency. Administration encompasses the techniques a 
competition agency uses to organize its operations, set 
priorities, and evaluate its effectiveness. 
Convergence as we see it does not anticipate the 
establishment of identical policies and enforcement 
mechanisms across the world’s competition policy systems. 
Complete uniformity—which we associate with the term 
“harmonization”—is probably unattainable.8 Variations in the 
economic conditions, history, legal process (e.g., civil law versus 
common law), and political science of individual jurisdictions 
are enduring sources of difference among competition systems.  
Nor do we think the pursuit of absolute congruence to be 
desirable. As described below, the development of competition 
law is inherently evolutionary and experimental.9 Since the 
first national legislation in Canada and the United States in 
the late nineteenth century, competition law standards have 
changed as a function of many forces, especially advances in 
industrial organization economics. Progress in implementation 
often takes place as individual jurisdictions test new 
approaches—for example, the substantive analytical 
framework introduced in the US Department of Justice (DOJ) 
Merger Guidelines of 1982 and the DOJ’s leniency reforms of 
the 1990s, which supplied powerful incentives for cartel 
participants to inform the government of their illegal 
behavior.10 These and other improvements in competition 
policy have occurred in a sequence of experimentation by which 
individual jurisdictions introduce reforms, gain experience, and 
 
 8. This discussion draws upon the framework set out in William E. 
Kovacic, Competition Policy in the European Union and the United States: 
Convergence or Divergence?, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EU: FIFTY YEARS 
ON FROM THE TREATY OF ROME 314 (Xavier Vives ed., 2009). 
 9. See infra pp. 311–12 (describing the evolutionary character of 
competition law). 
 10. See ICPAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 87–163 (describing importance of 
1982 DOJ merger guidelines and leniency policies introduced in 1990s). 
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assess results. Successful implementation induces other 
jurisdictions to emulate the reforms. To insist upon full 
uniformity across systems, or await unanimous approval before 
any single system undertook an innovation, would rob 
competition policy of a valuable source of continuing renewal 
and vitality. An objective we ascribe to the ICN and its two 
intergovernmental network counterparts is to realize the 
benefits of standardization without losing the useful innovation 
that comes from decentralized experimentation.  
While we do not anticipate or prefer programs to achieve 
total congruence across systems, we see great value in spurring 
convergence as we described the concept above. Some 
standardization with respect to substantive standards, 
procedure, and administration serves two useful ends. 
Widespread adoption of superior practices improves the 
performance of individual jurisdictions (by moving them from 
weaker to stronger approaches) and increases the effectiveness 
of competition policy as a form of global endeavor (by increasing 
the capacity of competition agencies as a group, through 
individual initiative and cross-border cooperation, to deter 
harmful business conduct). This is the rough equivalent of the 
process in medicine through which broad acceptance of superior 
treatments or surgical techniques improves the quality of 
health within and across jurisdictions.  
When better methods become available, society has a 
strong stake in their rapid and extensive adoption. To put the 
point in a negative form, there may be substantial harm if a 
jurisdiction persists in using manifestly inferior analytical 
approaches, procedures, or techniques for the administration of 
a competition agency. For example, adherence to badly 
conceived substantive tests not only can retard economic 
progress within a single jurisdiction, it can damage economic 
performance in other jurisdictions. If a country that applies an 
inferior approach is economically significant, companies doing 
business in global or regional trade may feel compelled to 
conform their practices to satisfy the demands of the single 
jurisdiction. These and other adverse spillovers give the larger 
community of nations a keen interest in the quality of the 
competition systems of individual countries.  
Standardization also can reduce unnecessary costs 
associated with antitrust enforcement. Such costs can arise, for 
example, from subjecting mergers to multiple individual 
national reviews, where each involves needlessly idiosyncratic 
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reporting requirements or where notification obligations sweep 
in transactions with little connection to commerce within a 
jurisdiction. Standardization which simplifies the review 
process—such as by enabling the merging parties to use a 
common form to report a proposed deal to numerous 
authorities—can reduce the costs of commerce without 
diminishing the quality of regulatory oversight. 
The potential benefits of convergence become more 
apparent as the complexity of global competition policy 
increases. For most of the twentieth century, few jurisdictions 
had competition laws, and still fewer had effective programs to 
enforce them.11 As late as the mid-1970s, only Germany, the 
European Union (EU), and the US had undertaken significant 
enforcement programs that commanded attention from 
business managers.12 With the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
adoption of market-oriented reforms by countries previously 
committed to central economic planning, many nations enacted 
competition laws or revived older, dormant antitrust statutes. 
Today, at least 112 jurisdictions have competition laws.13 
To spur convergence across this multitude of systems 
requires an understanding of the process of regulatory 
standardization and a vision of how a network of competition 
agencies, such as the ICN, can promote broad adoption of 
superior techniques. Since 2001, the ICN’s leadership has 
formulated a strategy that suggests how the network can best 
promote convergence in a global environment that features a 
broad decentralization of authority and extensive 
experimentation.14 
 
 11. See William E. Kovacic, Dominance, Duopoly and Oligopoly: The 
United States and the Development of Global Competition Policy, 13 GLOBAL 
COMPETITION REV. (2010) (reviewing trends in development of systems of 
competition law). 
 12. Id. 
 13. John Fingleton, The International Competition Network: Planning for 
the Second Decade, Address at the Ninth Annual Conference in Istanbul, 
Turkey (Apr. 27, 2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches
/689752/0410.pdf [hereinafter Second Decade Speech]. 
 14. The strategy we refer to here is an amalgam of views expressed by 
members of the ICN Steering Committee from the first years of the network’s 
establishment to the present. Two particularly formative statements are 
Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Competition Agencies in a 
Market-Based Global Economy, Address at the Annual Lecture of the 
European Foreign Affairs Review (July 23, 2002), available at 
www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/020723brussels.shtm [hereinafter EFA Speech] 
and Fingleton, Second Decade Speech, supra note 13. 
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As articulated by agency officials who have played major 
roles in the ICN’s early development and subsequent 
operations,15 international standardization in competition law 
is likely to unfold in three stages. The first is continuing, 
decentralized experimentation as individual jurisdictions test 
different substantive rules, analytical methods, procedures, 
and administrative techniques. The second stage is the 
identification of superior practices. In the third stage, countries 
voluntarily opt in to superior practices. General satisfaction 
with a particular standard may create a willingness by nations 
to embrace the standard and to embody within a treaty or other 
form of international obligation.  
With this framework in mind, how can an international 
network such as the ICN promote the adoption of superior 
standards? The ICN convergence strategy has four basic 
elements. The first is to increase understanding of the origins 
and operations of individual systems. The ICN does this mainly 
by serving as a convenor which engages its members—through 
its annual conference, through workshops, and through regular 
teleconferences—in regular discussions about existing practice 
within jurisdictions. This process illuminates similarities in 
substantive analysis and procedure across jurisdictions and 
deepens awareness of the sources of differences.  
Fuller understanding of system similarities and differences 
sets the foundation for ICN’s second contribution, which is to 
identify superior practices. Some approaches may readily stand 
out as superior once nations understand their application and 
grasp their effectiveness. Consensus about other practices may 
come about only after a longer process of discussion.  
The quality of consensus depends heavily on the methods 
 
 15. Two agency leaders stand out. One is Timothy Muris, who chaired the 
US Federal Trade Commission from June 2001 to August 2004. Muris 
committed substantial FTC resources to the ICN’s development and supplied 
an influential conceptual framework for understanding how the ICN could 
encourage adoption of superior techniques. See, e.g., EFA Speech, supra note 
14 (describing ICN’s possible contributions to the identification of superior 
practices). A professor of contract law and competition law, Muris pointed to 
the development of the Uniform Commercial Code in the US as a rough model 
for the work of the ICN. Id. John Fingleton, the current Chair of the ICN’s 
Steering Committee, is a second major source of thinking about the possible 
contributions of the ICN. Through initiatives such as the ICN Second Decade 
project, Fingleton has been instrumental in identifying ways in which the ICN 
can best serve the functions of education, consensus building, and 
implementation of superior techniques. See, e.g., Second Decade Speech, supra 
note 13. 
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used to achieve it. One major determinant of the perceived 
quality of consensus is the breadth and intensity of 
participation by the network’s members. A network’s value as a 
source of widely-accepted standards increases as the number of 
participating jurisdictions grows. To fulfill its intended role, the 
ICN requires broad participation by competition agencies from 
well-established market economies and transition economies 
alike. The imperative to achieve inclusive membership raises a 
dilemma. Most of the resources (notably, the time of top 
management and skilled staff) to support a network’s 
operations ordinarily reside in older, more experienced, and 
better funded agencies. Without the resource commitment of 
the wealthier jurisdictions, the ICN would collapse.  
At the same time, the magnitude of contributions (and, 
implicitly, control) by older, wealthier competition systems may 
raise doubts among less experienced and less wealthy 
jurisdictions that the network truly serves their interests. 
Based on other experiences in international relations, weaker 
states may see the multinational network as simply another 
venue in which more powerful nations trample them.16 
A second issue concerns participation by non-government 
advisors (NGAs) who come from academia, companies, 
consumer groups, economic consultancies, and law firms. NGAs 
can improve the quality of a network by, among other ways, 
providing information that public officials lack and in assisting 
in the implementation of standards proposed by the network.17 
They also can supply important contributions to the routine 
 
 16. In discussing the development of international norms in other areas of 
public policy, Professor Julie Mertus puts the point this way: “[P]owerful state 
and nonstate leaders from western countries overpower their nonwestern 
counterparts at world conferences. These leaders use their positions of 
authority in already-established transboundary networks to set the agenda, 
and they use their access to language and diplomacy skills to work that 
agenda to serve their own interests.” Julie Mertus, Considering Nonstate 
Actors in the New Millenium: Toward Expanded Participation in Norm 
Generation and Norm Application, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 537, 541–42 
(2000).  
 17. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and 
International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 274–75 (1997) (discussing 
potential benefits of NGO involvement in international organizations). For 
example, one form of knowledge uniquely within the hands of business 
enterprises and their advisors is information about the costs of complying with 
multiple merger reporting requirements. Another illustration is the 
information that academic researchers have assembled in the course of 
studying the process of international cooperation and convergence in various 
fields of public policy.  
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work of a network’s committees or working groups—for 
example, by conducting research or preparing background 
papers.18 
Where NGAs participate in a network’s proceedings (as 
they do extensively in the ICN), attaining a suitable mix of 
perspectives among such advisors is important. A network 
must see to it that its work is not captured, or seen to be 
captured, by specific external constituencies. In our own 
discussions with ICN competition agencies (especially from 
transition economies), we have heard recurring concerns that 
the ICN must increase participation by non-private sector 
NGAs—such as academics or officials of consumer groups—to 
balance the representation of NGAs from companies or law 
firms.  
The third step is to monitor and assess the extent of 
opting-in by the ICN’s members. The ICN’s effectiveness 
ultimately depends upon how fully its members integrate the 
network’s recommendations into their operations. Achieving 
broad agreement upon recommended practices, by itself, does 
not ensure that such standards become embedded in the 
practice of individual jurisdictions. This requires monitoring 
and continuing encouragement to coax members to apply the 
standards in practice.  
The fourth step is to promote interoperability across 
systems with respect to characteristics that remain dissimilar. 
Even with arduous efforts to achieve convergence, substantial 
differences across competition systems are likely to persist. 
Notwithstanding these differences, it is important to devise 
inter-agency links that facilitate routine communication and 
the treatment of conduct under examination by multiple 
authorities.  
In pursuing the strategy set out above, progress toward 
widely accepted standards will be easier to achieve in some 
areas than in others. Agreement on superior methods for 
effective management (e.g., the value of disclosure practices 
that reveal the agency’s intentions and reasons for enforcement 
decisions) may be easier to attain than agreement on some 
substantive liability tests. Within the range of substantive 
standards, a network is likely to find broader agreement about 
 
 18. Our view is that the ICN Merger Working Group would have achieved 
dramatically lower levels of productivity without the participation of private 
sector NGAs, especially lawyers experienced in counseling firms in cross-
border transactions. 
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the hazards of some forms of business conduct (e.g., collusive 
schemes involving rival suppliers) than others (e.g., the 
treatment of claims of improper exclusion by dominant firms).  
In light of these differences, a successful network is likely 
to have a diversified portfolio of projects. The mix is likely to 
include forward-looking exercises that analyze important 
economic phenomena or developments in economic or legal 
theory, on the one hand, and efforts to distill theory and 
experience into specific recommendations about substantive 
standards, procedures, and administrative practices, on the 
other hand. On the other hand, the portfolio of a network with 
a greater indigenous capacity to perform policy research (e.g., 
the OECD) is likely to contain a greater number of projects and 
reports that examine conceptual concerns or formative 
economic conditions in detail. 
One complication in assembling a portfolio of projects that 
suits a network’s members arises from expansions of 
membership. As a competition policy network grows, it may be 
difficult to pick topics that command broad interest across the 
network. Fissures may emerge on the basis of regional 
differences (e.g., competition agencies in the island economies 
of the Caribbean may have needs that are alien to the 
landlocked nations of Central Asia) or wide gaps in 
experience.19 In addition to, or as a substitute for their 
participation in the large, multinational networks, some 
countries might choose to focus resources competition 
initiatives undertaken in the context of regional networks such 
as ASEAN, CARICOM, and COMESA. 
Across networks, we can expect variation in the proportion 
of endeavors that emphasize theory or practice, universal 
matters or more localized concerns. Despite these differences, 
all networks share a common aim. All will invest significant 
effort in providing a steady flow of tangible outputs. These can 
include studies that shape thinking about a specific topic or 
recommendations about standards. Generating a stream of 
“deliverables” accomplishes several ends. For purposes of 
convergence, these outputs build the structure of standards 
that provide focal points for opting in by the network’s 
members.  
 
       19. Older, wealthier agencies may want to discuss the latest developments in 
merger simulation while a new agency may want to explore how one begins to 
create a team of economists. 
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A network’s outputs can vary in their significance and need 
not be uniformly path-breaking. Some measures, however, 
must be seen to be significant. A network is akin to a movie 
studio that must produce a certain number of commercially 
successful films to sustain its operations. For a competition 
policy network, the equivalents of major commercial “hits” 
enable the network also to turn out “indie” projects that have 
real substantive merit but do not yield massive box office 
revenues.  
The very process of turning out recommendations also can 
inspire future effort. As described more fully below,20 a 
demonstrated ability to provide visible results induces network 
members and NGAs to invest resources in the future. 
Deliverables provide the network’s major investors with a 
visible return on their commitment of resources. Multinational 
competition networks are voluntary endeavors, and each 
network must compete to obtain effort from its members. 
Competition agencies (and the political appointees who often 
head them) typically feel strong pressure to devote resources to 
immediate operational needs, such as the prosecution of 
cases.21 Especially in conditions of resource austerity, 
investments in building an infrastructure of international 
relations will tend to be seen as an appealing target for the 
budget cutter’s ax. 
These conditions sharpen an agency’s desire to scrutinize 
the yield from its investments in international networks. A 
competition authority that is dissatisfied with the output of a 
network is likely to disinvest by proposing that its government 
cut financial support for the network, by reducing the 
involvement of top level officials, by curbing the allocation of 
staff to network projects, or deciding not to attend network 
functions at all. NGAs make similar calculations in deciding 
whether to provide time to the network’s endeavors.  
 
 20. See infra pp. 287–88 (discussing how the willingness of member 
countries to invest effort in ICN, OECD, and UNCTAD depends partly on 
their perception of the capacity of these networks to deliver useful products). 
 21. On the tendency of competition agencies to be measured by the 
volume and prominence of their cases, see William E. Kovacic, The Digital 
Broadband Migration and the Federal Trade Commission: Building the 
Competition and Consumer Protection Agency of the Future, 8 J. TELECOM. & 
HIGH TECH. L. 1, 10–14 (2010). 
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II. THE ICN IN CONTEXT: THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL 
COMPETITION NETWORKS 
International networks have gained in prominence as 
forums for discussion and cooperation on competition law. The 
ICN’s approach to addressing international competition law 
issues is relatively flexible, informal, and non-binding. This 
allows countries to participate without committing to specific 
changes in law or policy.22 Continuous interaction fosters 
commonly defined goals, and regulators focus more on shared 
agendas instead of more narrowly defined national interests.23 
In this section, we situate the ICN in the landscape of 
other international organizations that have played important 
roles in the development of international competition policy 
standards. Before the ICN’s formation, the most important 
international networks for competition policy were the OECD, 
UNCTAD, and the WTO.24 We review the origins and 
characteristics of these organizations and compare them to the 
ICN.  
One basic characteristic of the three currently active 
competition networks—ICN, OECD, and UNCTAD—warrants 
emphasis. In major respects, they are rivals. They are public 
policy joint ventures whose principal “shareholders” are largely 
the same. The major shareholders are the agencies (or 
governments) that supply the bulk of a network’s budget or 
otherwise play a central role in determining a network’s 
effectiveness. They exercise this role by deciding to send top 
management to important network events and to assign highly 
capable staff to participate in the network’s activities. Every 
year, a competition agency decides how much to invest in each 
network: to increase resources, to reduce participation, or to 
sustain existing levels of effort—in effect, to buy, sell, or hold 
shares in the venture.  
Individual networks prosper or decline according to their 
ability to attract resources from their main shareholders. 
Without a critical mass of effort by agency leaders, a network 
becomes a meeting place for agency staff who lack the status to 
speak authoritatively for their institutions. Moreover, if 
agencies downgrade the quality of staff assigned to perform 
 
 22. See Anu Piilola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case 
Study of International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 215–16 
(2003). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See ICPAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 33–39. 
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research and draft network documents, the network’s work 
product visibly suffers. Each network knows that its days are 
numbered when top management disengages and withdraws 
top quality staff from network activities. 
In the framework of the multinational competition 
networks, the ICN’s position in 2001 posed some significant 
risks. As is the case with new entrants in commercial markets 
occupied by a handful of seemingly entrenched incumbents, the 
ICN had to cope with product line repositioning and sometimes 
edgy resistance by the OECD and UNCTAD. The ICN’s 
business model presented special potential difficulties. The ICN 
portrayed itself as the fast, agile, highly maneuverable fighter 
aircraft juxtaposed with the OECD’s and UNCTAD’s slow, 
ungainly commercial transports. This compelled the ICN to 
produce quick, visible results consistent with its institutional 
vision. By contrast, the OECD and UNCTAD each enjoyed an 
established and, in many cases, loyal installed base of members 
and therefore had more margin for error. A large commercial 
airliner can glide for a considerable distance if its engines shut 
down. Turn off the engines on a fighter aircraft, and it glides 
like a two-car garage. 
The three existing competition networks can be seen as 
suppliers of complementary policy products. Their varied 
organizational forms and functions lend themselves to different 
product lines. As discussed more fully below, these product 
lines sometimes overlap (creating a degree of head-to-head 
competition between networks). The products also can be 
complementary. Of the three networks, the OECD has the 
strongest capacity to generate in-depth policy research papers, 
yet the ICN and UNCTAD arguably have greater ability to 
disseminate policy work by reason of their more inclusive 
membership policies. In the research and analysis dimension of 
network performance, the OECD has a better production 
facility, but the ICN and UNCTAD have superior distribution 
networks. In still other areas—such as the production of 
teaching materials to train new competition agency staff—it is 
evident that collaboration between two or more networks might 
enable them to assemble products or bundles of services whose 
quality exceeds that which any single network can attain on its 
own.25 As we discuss below, a major issue for the three 
networks is whether they can cooperate in ways that permit 
 
 25. The authors are grateful to Sally Van Siclen for this observation. 
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the realization of important complementarities.  
To anticipate one of our conclusions, we see ways in which 
the three networks can prosper and make important 
contributions to convergence upon superior competition policy 
standards. We also can imagine that the centrifugal forces of 
rivalry for resources and recognition that beset the networks 
could frustrate the realization of this vision. If the ventures and 
their common owners cannot overcome such tensions, the 
decline or outright demise of one or more of the three 
competition policy networks is conceivable. Such a development 
would deprive the global competition community of the benefits 
of rivalry-driven experimentation that occurs today in the ICN, 
the OECD, and UNCTAD and eliminate the gains that could 
come from linking complementary capabilities among them.  
To orientate the discussion for this section, in Table I 
below we have laid out in a simplified form the characteristics 
of three of the major networks: the ICN, the OECD, and 
UNCTAD.  
TABLE 1: THE MULTINATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY 
NETWORKS 
Network Competitio
n Policy: 
Status 
Membership Principal 
Products 
Secretariat 
and 
Facilities 
Member 
Interactio
n 
OECD CLPC Unit of large, 
diversified 
parent body 
Governments
: economically 
developed 
states, plus 
observers 
Research, 
peer 
reviews, 
standards, 
technical 
assistance, 
toolkits 
Full-time 
secretariat 
in Paris HQ; 
two regional 
centers 
Meetings 
three times 
annually in 
Paris 
UNCTAD 
Competitio
n Group 
Unit of large, 
diversified 
parent body 
Governments
: no screening 
based on level 
of economic 
development 
Standards
, peer 
reviews, 
technical 
assistance 
Full-time 
secretariat 
in Geneva 
HQ 
Annual 
Meeting in 
Geneva 
ICN No parent 
body; sole 
focus is 
competition 
law & policy 
Competition 
agencies: no 
screening 
based on level 
of economic 
development 
Standards
, practical 
guides and 
toolkits, 
workshops 
for 
member 
Virtual body: 
no physical 
headquarter
s or 
dedicated 
secretaries 
Annual 
Conference; 
telephone 
conferences; 
leadership 
convenes at 
OECD Paris 
meetings 
 Table 1 captures several important features of the 
networks. It helps identify key respects in which we can model 
the networks as rivals, and it is a start to mapping out 
complementarities that could provide useful areas for future 
cooperation among the networks. 
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A. THE OECD 
Established in 1961, the OECD now has thirty-four 
member countries.26 One of the OECD’s most important 
characteristics is its membership criteria. Full participation in 
the organization is confined to countries from the more 
economically developed world. Although the OECD has taken a 
number of measures to engage less developed economies, this 
limitation served as an important reason for the creation of the 
ICN, which readily made membership available to all 
jurisdictions with a competition law and a mechanism for its 
enforcement.27 
The OECD supports economic growth and development 
among its members through a variety of programs. It monitors, 
analyzes, and publishes reports on macroeconomic trends and 
microeconomic policy developments. Its chief operational units 
consist of approximately 250 committees, expert groups, and 
working groups that provide members with regular 
opportunities to discuss issues of economic development and 
regulatory policy. On a number of occasions, the work of the 
committees has helped catalyze the formation of a broad-based 
international consensus about major policy issues such as the 
establishment of antitrust programs to combat cartels.28 
Member countries hold decision making authority for the 
OECD. As noted above, the OECD’s members are governments. 
Officials from individual government agencies or departments 
conduct the business of committees and working groups. The 
freedom of these officials to maneuver and express their views 
in these settings is not uninhibited, for they serve within the 
OECD as representatives of their governments, not merely as 
spokespersons for their own institutions. Member countries 
usually assign an ambassador (and a substantial support staff) 
to the OECD. It is common for a representative of the country’s 
OECD embassy staff to observe meetings of committees or 
working groups, especially if sensitive issues are on the agenda. 
 
 26. History, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., 
www.oecd.org/document/25/0,3746,en_36734052_36761863_36952473_1_1_1_1
,00.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 27. See INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ICN FACTSHEET AND KEY 
MESSAGES 5 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnet
work.org/uploads/library/doc608.pdf (discussing ICN’s membership criteria). 
 28. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 
Recommendations of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard 
Core Cartels (Mar. 25, 1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/4/2
350130.pdf. 
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When the OECD speaks as an institution and makes policy 
recommendations, its views carry the force of its member 
governments. Because it is a body of governments and takes 
decisions by consensus, however, the path to reaching a 
recommendation can be long and tortuous.  
The OECD obtains its operating budget (in the current 
fiscal year, approximately €350 million) from member 
contributions. Member payments fund a secretariat staff of 
approximately 2500;29 most staff work at the organization’s 
headquarters in Paris. Among other functions, the secretariat 
supports the committees and working groups. Many members 
of the CLPC secretariat previously have worked in government 
bodies in their home countries, and they give the OECD the in-
depth substantive expertise and capacity to prepare first-rate 
reports on a wide array of policy issues. Although the OECD’s 
CLPC secretariat is a great source of analytical strength, the 
size and deliberateness of the OECD’s bureaucracy as a whole 
sometimes attracts criticism.30 The perception of the OECD 
administrative machinery as unduly ponderous is a major 
reason for the ICN’s insistence that it is a virtual network 
unencumbered by physical structures or a large, permanent 
staff.31 The aversion to having the ICN establish any form of 
traditional secretariat seems to stem from the fear that a 
replica of the OECD’s substantial Paris campus and a laborious 
pace of operations soon would follow. 
The OECD began to address antitrust issues soon after its 
creation in 1961 when it formed the CLPC. The CLPC has 
served an important function as what some commentators have 
called a “convener”—an institution that supplies a venue for 
institutions to improve their understanding of other systems 
and encourage cooperation.32 The CLPC provided the first 
significant post-World War II international forum for members 
 
 29. See OECD, Who Does What, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761791_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 30. The CLPC is a sub-unit of the Directorate for Financial and 
Enterprise Affairs, which is one of twelve OECD directorates.  
 31. Kovacic participated extensively in discussions about the organization 
and management of ICN in its first years and recalls the determination of 
many ICN members to avoid giving the new network institutional attributes 
resembling those of OECD.  
 32. See Kirsten Lundberg, Convener or Player?: The World Economic 
Forum and Davos, 1741.0 KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV. CASE STUDY 1 (2004) 
(discussing how the World Economic Forum, by convening meetings of experts, 
established an international policy network and helped set an agenda of policy 
issues for consideration by leaders in academia, business, and government). 
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to collect information on antitrust topics, to meet regularly to 
discuss their experiences, and to build a network of 
relationships that strengthen cooperation among different 
jurisdictions.33 The CLPC’s structure today reflects the 
increasing complexity of competition policy and the global 
expansion of competition law systems. The Committee houses 
two working parties and various outreach programs—notably, 
the Global Forum on Competition—devoted to competition 
issues.34 To organize and support these activities, the CLPC 
draws upon a superb secretariat of administrators, researchers, 
and an ensemble of external consultants.35 Member country 
rankings of the OECD’s many committees routinely place 
CLPC at or near the top of the ladder.36 
A significant element of CLPC’s efforts to build a common 
base of experience and to encourage adoption of superior 
techniques is preparation of studies known as country reviews 
or peer reviews. In the peer review, a member country or 
OECD observer requests an examination of its competition 
system, and a competition expert retained by CLPC prepares a 
detailed study.37 The expert reviews published texts (e.g. 
statutes, implementing regulations, decisions, policy 
statements, guidelines) and conducts interviews with agency 
officials and observers outside the competition agency (e.g. 
academics, business associations, consumer groups, other 
government bodies, and the private bar). The consultant 
presents the peer review at one of the CLPC’s regular 
 
 33. See Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional 
Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 BERKELEY BUS. 
L.J. 37, 47 (2007). 
 34. See On-Line Guide to OECD Intergovernmental Activity, OECD (Mar. 
6, 2011), http://webnet.oecd.org/OECDGROUPS/BBodie/ListByNameView.asp
x?book=true (including the Competition Committee, the Global Forum on 
Competition, the Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation, and the 
Working Party No. 3 on Co-operation and Enforcement). 
 35. Some members of the CLPC secretariat are full time employees with 
the rough equivalent of civil service tenure. Others have shorter-term 
contracts ranging from six months to three years. In still other cases, staff are 
seconded by and funded by OECD member governments. Many CLPC 
consultants have served previously as members of the secretariat staff. 
 36. Periodic reports provided to the CLPC “Bureau”—the name given to 
the committee’s governing board—indicate that OECD members routinely give 
the CLPC superior evaluations. 
 37. See Country Reviews, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/countryreviews (Mar. 6, 2011). The experts 
who prepare the peer review studies often have extensive experience with this 
exercise and are skillful observers of competition policy. 
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gatherings, and officials from the agency under study respond 
to questions from member countries.38 Other competition policy 
networks—notably, UNCTAD—have emulated this practice 
and conducted their own series of peer reviews. 39 
As written, the OECD (and UNCTAD) peer reviews fall 
short of being a completely uninhibited assessment of the 
quality of the examinee’s competition system.40 For example, if 
the examiner finds the agency’s top managers to be inept, or 
the national courts to be corrupt, the peer review report will 
not quite say so. The pulled punches are understandable. Only 
a competition agency (or, in the case of government-based 
organizations such as OECD and UNCTAD, a government) 
with the highest degree of self-assurance would volunteer to 
participate in a peer review that mercilessly exposed 
weaknesses in a reviewed agency or the larger framework of 
public administration. An analogy would be academia, where 
instructors who freely dispense failing marks often find their 
courses cancelled due to inadequate enrollment. On the whole, 
newer agencies are relatively more welcome to unvarnished 
criticism and regard peer review as an opportunity to improve 
their operations. Older systems are more thin-skinned and 
likely to see peer review as a potential threat rather than an 
occasion to learn and grow.  
The airbrushing in published peer reviews does not 
undermine the essential value of such exercises. Even with 
euphemisms and evasions, peer reviews are valuable tools for 
identifying areas of improvement. The final written report may 
soft-peddle system flaws, but the consultant ordinarily gives 
the examinee a candid spoken briefing that spares nothing. The 
 
 38. In one sense, the label of “peer review” is a misnomer. As used in 
academic and scientific circles, a peer review usually entails an assessment of 
one researcher’s work by other researchers who are expert in the field. In the 
CLPC, the principal examiner is a single expert consultant whom the 
committee retains. The examinee’s true peers—other competition agencies—
participate in the review only by asking questions at the committee session at 
which the consultant presents her findings. OECD member competition 
systems do not perform their own study of the examinee, and their questions 
frequently are scripted by the expert consultant or the OECD secretariat. The 
questions posed by the panel of other competition authorities are not shared 
with the examinee before the formal session. 
 39. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., Voluntary Peer Review Process, (Mar. 
6, 2011), www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItintI=4163&lang+1 
(discussing UNCTAD’s voluntary peer reviews on competition law and policy). 
 40. The discussion here is based on Kovacic’s experience with the OECD 
and UNCTAD peer review processes. 
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very effort to prepare for and participate in a review usually 
causes competition agencies to reflect carefully upon its work 
and thereby can stimulate improvements. Finally, the 
published report’s recommendations about needed adjustments 
in legislation, organization, or resources, albeit sometimes 
muted, can nevertheless lend influential international support 
for suggested reforms. Notwithstanding the limitations 
discussed here, the OECD peer reviews supply an informative 
perspective on the development of competition policy systems 
over the past twenty years. 
The peer review is one significant element of a portfolio of 
CLPC mechanisms that facilitate convergence upon superior 
substantive concepts and procedures. The regular CLPC 
meetings permit members to share experiences, identify 
strengths and weaknesses of existing enforcement approaches, 
and discuss new developments in economic and legal theory 
affecting competition law.41 In our conversations with 
representatives of countries that participate actively in the 
ICN, OECD, and UNCTAD, many have said that OECD 
provides the best forum for in-depth exploration and debate 
concerning substantive policy issues. The CLPC secretariat 
prepares background papers for most sessions of the committee 
and its working parties. Members regard these research studies 
as a valuable resource,due to their thoughtful, balanced 
analytical approach.  
In some instances, CLPC programs foster consensus that 
generates formal OECD recommendations.42 The OECD has 
published influential recommendations and best practices 
related to the appropriate treatment of specific business 
practices, the relation of competition policy to other forms of 
government regulation, and the means for cooperation among 
competition authorities.43 The OECD policy recommendations 
 
 41. The CLPC meets in Paris three times annually—usually in February, 
June, and October. In the months before each session, members receive a call 
for papers on topics to be considered by the CLPC working parties and in the 
committee’s plenary sessions. These requests typically elicit a substantial 
number of contributions which collectively provide comparative perspectives 
on substantive policy issues and a detailed compendium of enforcement 
experience. 
 42. See Sokol, supra note 33, at 47. 
 43. See, e.g., Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action 
Against Hard Core Cartels, Org. for Econ. Co-op. and Dev. Council 
C(98)35/FINAL (May. 14, 1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/
4/2350130.pdf; Recommendation of the Council Concerning Structural 
Separation in Regulated Industries, O.E.C.D. C(2001)78/FINAL (Jun. 16, 
KOVACIC - Final Version 4/22/20116:19 PM 
294 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW [Vol 20:2 
 
are non-binding. In a number of instances, member countries 
do not comply with the OECD’s recommendations.44 Nor does 
the OECD process move expeditiously. Many OECD projects 
have proceeded at an extremely deliberate pace. This lends the 
impression (and, sometimes, reveals the reality) that the OECD 
cannot respond quickly and effectively to new, urgent concerns 
of its members. Nonetheless, the OECD’s prescriptions 
involving competition law and other areas of international 
economic policy (such as efforts to discourage commercial 
bribery) have encouraged discussion about potential reforms 
and supported jurisdictions that are contemplating reforms.45 
Compared to the ICN and UNCTAD, the OECD’s relatively 
small, homogeneous membership of thirty-four developed 
countries leads to an easier building of consensus, but this 
advantage is double-edged.46 The lack of significant input from 
the developing world can limit the perspective that informs 
OECD recommendations and, in the eyes of nonmembers, 
makes its prescriptions less attractive. Our discussions with 
OECD officials indicate that concerns about under-inclusive 
membership played a major part in the CLPC’s establishment 
of the Global Forum on Competition (GFC) in the fall of 2001.47 
The GFC enabled the CLPC to expand its access to a wide 
range of nonmember jurisdictions, especially to transition 
economies. We cannot offer a rigorous proof for the proposition, 
but our discussions with OECD officials and OECD members 
 
2003), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/49/25315195.pdf; 
O.E.C.D., Recommendation of the Council Concerning Merger Review, 
O.E.C.D. C(2005)34 (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd
/3/41/40537528.pdf; O.E.C.D. Competition Comm., Best Practices for the 
Formal Exchange of Information Between Competition Authorities in Hard 
Core Cartel Investigations (Oct. 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/33/3559
0548.pdf; O.E.C.D. Competition Comm., Guiding Principles for Regulatory 
Quality and Performance, (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoe
cd/19/51/37318586.pdf; Recommendation on Competition Assessment, O.E.C.D. 
C(2009)130 (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,37
46,en_2649_37463_44080714_1_1_1_37463,00&&en-USS_01DBC.html. 
 44. See Sokol, supra note 33, at 47. 
 45. See ICPAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 281–300 (discussing the impact of 
the OECD’s policy recommendations). 
 46. See Konrad von Finckenstein, International Antitrust Cooperation: 
Bilateralism or Multilateralism?, JOINT MEETING OF THE ABA SEC. OF 
ANTITRUST L. & THE CAN. BAR ASSOC. NAT’L COMP. L. SEC. (May. 31, 2001), 
available at http://210.69.106.168/doc/Canada/Policy/1a.htm. 
 47. See generally, Global Forum on Competition, O.E.C.D., 
www.oecd.org/competition/globalforum (last visited May. 12, 2011) 
(introducing the Global Forum). The GFC usually convenes once per year at 
the CLPC’s February meeting. 
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suggest that potential competition from what eventually 
became the ICN also inspired the GFC’s creation.48 OECD also 
has established regional competition centers in Hungary and 
South Korea, in partnership with the national competition 
authorities in those countries,49 and it sponsors a Latin 
American Competition Forum, which hosts events for countries 
in that region. These centers provide platforms for conducting 
seminars and training programs for neighboring countries, 
including non-OECD members. 
B. UNCTAD 
The United Nations created UNCTAD in 1964 to help 
developing countries form and implement economic policy.50 In 
the 1970s, UNCTAD suggested a “New International Economic 
Order,” which involved a series of proposals designed to shift 
the balance of economic power toward developing countries.51 
One topic was restrictive business practices, which included the 
application of competition law.52 
These discussions led the United Nations to adopt in 1980 
UNCTAD’s proposal, the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable 
Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices (the Set).53 The UN described the Set as establishing 
“broad principles and rules encouraging the adoption and 
strengthening of competition legislation and policies at the 
national and regional levels, and at promoting international 
 
 48. The OECD’s leadership and the CLPC management team were aware 
of discussions in the late 1990s and early 2000s about the need for a new 
international network to include more of the world’s competition agencies. 
They knew that a reason offered for establishing a new network was OECD’s 
restrictions on membership. The CLPC convened its first GFC meeting in 
Paris shortly after the announcement of ICN’s creation. 
 49. For the centers in Hungary and South Korea, the host country county 
competition agencies provide most of the funds (over 90%) for facilities and 
operations. The OECD lends its name and technical expertise to the ventures. 
 50. See generally, U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., About UNCTAD, 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1530&lang=1 (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
 51. See U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., A Brief History of UNCTAD, 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3358&lang=1 (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2011) (describing history of UNCTAD). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Diane Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real International Antitrust, 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 277, 285–86 (1992); see also, e.g., Ioannis Lianos, The 
Contribution of the United Nations to the Emergence of Global Antitrust Law, 
15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415, 422 (2007). 
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cooperation in this area.”54 The Set was unanimously adopted, 
but due to its voluntary nature it did not have a legally binding 
effect.55 Also limiting the impact of the Set was the reality that 
at its time of establishment many nations had no competition 
law, which meant that the Set was largely aspirational.56 
Due in part to its nonbinding nature, the Set has not 
evolved into the source of international competition law that its 
creators envisioned. To a number of observers, the compromises 
embedded in the Set’s preparation also robbed the document of 
an important element of analytical persuasiveness and thus 
impeded broad acceptance. The Set has encountered recurring 
criticism that its provisions are too vague and represent the 
“lowest common-denominator work product.”57 
Although the Set has not served as a template for the 
broad adoption of antitrust prescriptions, it has proved useful 
in providing a focal point for discussion and being a stimulus 
for consideration of other approaches.58 Moreover, in the 
context of conferences and meetings convened by UNCTAD, the 
Set and its periodic annotation have supplied an important 
basis for continued international discussion about competition 
law and policy issues. An Intergovernmental Group of Experts 
(IGE) meets yearly to discuss approaches for improving 
cooperation and convergence on competition issues.59 The IGE 
also conducts debates, roundtables, and voluntary peer reviews 
 
 54. U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., UNCTAD GUIDEBOOK ON 
COMPETITION SYSTEMS, ati, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2007/2 (2007), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20072_en.pdf. 
 55. See Wood, supra note 53, at 429 (recognizing that the Set does not 
have binding legal effect, but arguing that it may contribute to customary 
international law on the subject). 
 56. See Sokol, supra note 33, at 48. 
 57. Id. at 104. 
 58. Report of the Sixth United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of 
the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control 
of Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF.7/11, at 7 (Jan. 25, 
2011), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf7d11_en.pdf 
(describing views of UNCTAD participants about the impact of UN Set). 
 59. See U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., Intergovernmental Group of Experts 
on Competition Law and Policy, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?in
tItemID=4068&lang=1 (last visited Mar. 13, 2011). These meetings tend not to 
attractthe top leadership from the competition agencies of the UN’s members. 
See Russell W. Damtoft & Ronan Flanagan, The Development of International 
Networks in Antitrust, 43 INT’L LAWYER 137, 145 (2009) (UNCTAD’s 
competition meetings “are heavily populated by resident diplomats who are 
not well-versed in competition law.”). 
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modeled along the lines of OECD peer reviews.60 There is a UN 
conference every five years to review the Set.61 The most recent 
five-year review, conducted in Geneva early in November 2010, 
reveals that UNCTAD reaches an audience of developing 
countries that do not participate in the OECD or ICN events. 
To a large extent, UNCTAD remains the only significant forum 
through which a number of low-income countries that have 
recently enacted competition laws or are considering such 
measures may engage in international discussions about 
competition policy. This attribute gives UNCTAD an important, 
unique capacity to support the development of competition 
policy in nations with few, if any, links to the ICN or OECD. 
The five year review held in November 2010 featured an 
example of the type of innovations that have emerged from the 
efforts of competition policy networks to respond more 
effectively to the needs of the members. UNCTAD used the 
meeting to launch a new network of academic advisors to assist 
in identifying worthy projects and to provide comments on the 
existing UNCTAD competition agenda. Among international 
networks, UNCTAD’s initiative is the first systematic effort to 
engage academics in the formulation and implementation of a 
competition network’s program. Among other consequences, the 
academics’ network can help UNCTAD augment its research 
and analysis capabilities through a loose joint venture with 
external parties.  
Over time, “soft law” institutions like the ICN and OECD 
may eclipse UNCTAD’s competition policy program.62 From the 
time of the UN’s adoption of the Set through the 1990s, 
UNCTAD acquired a reputation for expressing antagonism to 
analytical perspectives that caution against various forms of 
antitrust intervention or that assign preeminence to economics 
as a basis for formulating a more intervention-minded 
program.63 By contrast, in the past decade, however, we detect 
a shift away from this orientation toward a philosophy that 
encourages greater caution in some forms of competition law 
enforcement and accepts more readily analytical methods 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. See U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., U.N. Conference for the Review of 
the Set, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=4103&lang=1 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
 62. Tadeusz Gruchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for Understanding “Soft 
Law”, 30 MCGILL L.J. 37 (1984–85) (examining the concept of “soft law.”). 
 63. See Sokol, supra note 33, at 105. 
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informed by modern industrial organization economics. Some 
members of UNCTAD’s core “client base”—the less wealthy 
developing countries—have become members of the ICN and 
have devoted progressively greater resources to ICN’s 
activities.64 Others have expanded their investment in OECD 
through time devoted to attendance at the Global Forum on 
Competition and participation in regional events that the 
OECD sponsors.65 
UNCTAD’s efforts to define its place in a crowded policy 
market points to a larger phenomenon within global 
competition policy. The emergence of the ICN and the 
establishment of competition policy projects within the context 
of regional initiatives confront new authorities with difficult 
resource choices.66 Many new agencies lack the resources to 
assign more than one or two persons to focus on international 
relations, and their budgets can support travel to a few events 
each year. Compared to the ICN, the OECD and UNCTAD 
have relatively greater capacity to generate funds to support 
travel by less wealthy competition agencies to their meetings. 
Even when a new agency receives full financial support to 
attend an international event, it must decide how much time of 
its small staff to commit to these endeavors. This constraint 
has forced UNCTAD—as well as the ICN and OECD—to 
improve the quality of their “product lines” to attract 
participation.  
UNCTAD resembles the OECD in that it can draw upon an 
expert secretariat to support its operations. UNCTAD’s 
competition policy secretariat is located on the UN’s Geneva 
campus, and its core function today is to support UNCTAD’s 
extensive technical assistance program. UNCTAD’s competition 
policy secretariat has approximately ten professionals. Only a 
 
 64. For example, in this group we would include countries such as 
Zambia, which has been an important participant in ICN activities. 
 65. For weakly funded agencies with small staff, attendance at 
international events and participation in international networks involve major 
resource commitments—even if other institutionsare paying the costs of 
accommodation and transport to the foreign event. In a small, underfunded 
office, the person assigned to handle international liaison matters is likely to 
have other responsibilities as well. Time spent in international liaison 
activities comes at the expense of performing other duties. Such agencies may 
decide to participate in one or two international/regional networks only. 
 66. In addition to large international networks, various regional bodies 
are seeking to increase their competition policy programs. These include older 
regional networks such as ASEAN and CARICOM, as well as new endeavors 
such as the African Competition Forum. 
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few of these positions are full-time appointments within the 
UN.67 UNCTAD relies heavily on short-term (six months or 
less) renewable contracts. UNCTAD’s custom is to renew these 
agreements, but their short nominal duration and the lack of 
guarantees about renewal impede the recruitment and 
retention of capable staff.  
In principle, UNCTAD and OECD have access to large 
reservoirs of research and know-how that each institution has 
accumulated over time. The two networks have assembled a 
substantial body of reports, peer reviews, internal reports on 
field work, and other data dealing with the development of 
competition policy in many countries. Some of this material is 
in the public domain (e.g., peer reviews), but a great deal of 
information either is held internally or comes in the form of 
unwritten know-how. UNCTAD staff who have supervised or 
conducted technical assistance programs have an especially 
broad and deep perspective on the design and implementation 
of capacity building projects.  
To assimilate the body of knowledge accumulated by the 
OECD and UNCTAD and apply it effectively to formulate 
future programs is not an easy task. The pressure to prepare 
for the next meeting or complete the next report tends to 
deflect attention away from the mining of the historical 
information base and the application of past work to new 
endeavors. We suspect there are considerable gains to be had 
for each network in making more effective use of what it has 
learned. We can also envision considerable advantages to 
having these pools of knowledge combined and used to inform 
the standard-setting activities of all three major networks, 
especially the ICN. There could be a division of labor in which 
the OECD and UNCTAD serve as suppliers of inputs (e.g., 
detailed knowledge about past country experiences) that the 
ICN cannot easily generate on its own. Doing so would require 
greater integration of effort among the three networks as well 
asa collaboration of efforts to map out product lines, identify 
complementarities, and determine which institution is best 
suited to perform specific tasks that lead to convergence upon 
superior substantive standards, procedures, and administrative 
techniques. 
 
 67. As described to us by UNCTAD officials, this pattern reflects more 
general efforts by the UN to cope with budget constraints b y reducing the 
number of full-time employees in favor of more flexible and often renewable 
short-term arrangements. 
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C. WTO 
Created in 1994, the World Trade Organization appeared 
to be a promising forum to house a multinational competition 
law regime. Karel van Miert, the European Commissioner for 
Competition, appointed a group of ‘wisemen’ to draft 
recommendations on the subject.68 The group issued a report in 
1995 encouraging the strengthening of bilateral cooperation, 
but they explained that convergence and cooperation strategies 
would likely be insufficient.69 The group favored, instead, the 
establishment of a worldwide competition code. It was 
envisaged that states would apply the code under the auspices 
of the WTO.70 These findings led the EC to propose the 
establishment of a Working Group on the Intersection between 
Trade and Competition Policy at the WTO’s 1996 Singapore 
meeting.71 
The WTO working group that was eventually established 
published several reports between 1998 and 2001.72 Those 
reports led the WTO to issue a declaration at the WTO’s Doha 
conference in 2001, positively encouraging the group’s 
continuing work.73 At the WTO’s Fifth Ministerial Conference 
in Cancun in 2003, the organization suspended the operation of 
the working group and dropped antitrust from its agenda.74 
Similar to the criticism leveled at the UNCTAD Set, a 
number of observers have suggested that a WTO agreement on 
competition law would provide only a minimum set of 
competition standards that would lead to nothing more than 
compliance with those minimum standards. Some jurisdictions 
also were concerned that the WTO enforcement body would 
infringe on their own sovereignty, and expressed doubt that an 
agreement was even possible between members with diverse 
 
 68. David J. Gerber, Is Reconciliation Possible? The U.S.-European 
Conflict over the Globalization of Antitrust Law: A Legal Perspective, 33 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 123, 129 (1999). 
 69. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW TRADE 
ORDER: STRENGTHENING COOPERATION AND RULES—REPORT OF THE GROUP 
OF EXPERTS (1995). 
 70. See DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION 103–04 (2010) 
[hereinafter GLOBAL COMPETITION]. 
 71. See ICPAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 262–63. 
 72. See GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 104; see also Philip 
Marsden, Competition Policy at the WTO, 1 COMPETITION L. INSIGHT 6 (Nov. 
2002); Trade and Competition: Interview with Frederic Jenny, 1 COMPETITION 
L. INSIGHT3 (Nov. 2002). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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national interests.75 Opposition also came from many 
developing countries who thought that a competition 
agreement enforced through the WTO would reflect US, 
European and Japanese interests aligned to force open 
developing world markets to foreign firms.76 
There remains the possibility that the WTO could revive 
its working group on competition law and direct the group to 
return to the task of devising a framework for international 
competition law.77 One condition that could support the revival 
of the WTO working group is the increase since 2004 in the 
number of transition economies with competition law systems 
(e.g., China and Egypt) and the significant retooling of older 
mechanisms in emerging markets (e.g., India and Pakistan). 
An advantage that a restored working group would enjoy is 
seven years of experience in the form of the ICN, OECD, and 
UNCTAD efforts to build consensus and convert consensus 
views into recommended standards.  
D. ICN 
Filling the gap for a soft law institution that included both 
developing and developed nations, the ICN evolved from 
suggestions by the International Competition Policy Advisory 
Committee (ICPAC) formed in November 1997.78 ICPAC 
researched international competition law and policy and 
reported its findings in February 2000.79 The ICPAC report 
advocated a soft law approach to international competition 
cooperation and proposed a Global Competition Initiative.80 
 
 75. Id. at 129–37. 
 76. Seeid. at 134–38. 
 77. Id. at 129–30 
 78. History, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about/history.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2011). Two especially informative discussions of the ICN have 
been prepared by experts who played roles in ICPAC and its recommendation 
that inspired ICN’s formation. Professor Merrit Janow, who served as staff 
director for ICPAC and was the principal author of the group’s report, in 2002 
authored an account of the possible future relationship between ICN and the 
WTO’s competition working group. See Merit Janow, Observations on Two 
Multilateral Venues: The International Competition Network (ICN) and the 
WTO, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: 2002 FORDHAM 
CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 49 (Barry Hawk ed., 2003). Professor Eleanor Fox, 
who served as an ICPAC member, has prepared the best single review of the 
ICN’s formation and subsequent operations. See Eleanor M. Fox, Linked In: 
Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network, 43 INT’L LAWYER, 151 (2009). 
 79. ICPAC REPORT, supra note2. 
 80.  See generally id. (advocating the soft law approach to international 
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This led to the ICN’s formation in 2001. 
The ICN has strived to distinguish itself from other 
networks. One of its chief distinctive traits is the relatively 
narrow scope of its substantive agenda. As described above, 
antitrust is not the sole or principal concern of the OECD, 
UNCTAD, or the WTO. By contrast, the ICN emphasizes that it 
is the only international organization dedicated to “all 
competition, all the time.”81 In the ICN, competition policy need 
not battle for resources amid the many pursuits that command 
attention in multi-function bodies such as the OECD82 and 
UNCTAD, nor does antitrust live in the shadow of trade policy 
cast by the WTO.  
The ICN has espoused a single-minded focus on 
competition law, yet two developments lead one to ask whether 
the ICN can sustain the purity of this substantive vision over 
time. One force is the need to address problems that arise 
mainly in other policy domains yet have important competition 
policy implications. For example, the financial crisis that began 
in 2008 has stimulated far-reaching debates about the very 
efficacy of the market system and the value of competition as 
an ingredient of economic policy. Competition agencies must 
confront the direct and indirect effects of the crisis, which, 
 
competition cooperation). 
 81. ICN Factsheet and Key Messages, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
NETWORK, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/do
c608.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2011). 
 82. OECD provides an example of the difficulties that a competition 
network housed within a multi-function institution faces in defining and 
sustaining a program. In recent years, we have observed how the OECD 
secretariat has pushed its committees—including the CLPC—to commit 
resources and meeting time to overarching projects (called “horizontal” 
initiatives within the OECD) that seek to link the work of the entire OECD 
committee structure and permit the organization to hold itself out as leading 
an integrated analysis of specific economic phenomena or policy issues. One 
recent initiative has involved the implementation of low-carbon technologies 
and less environmentally disruptive strategies for achieving economic growth. 
The OECD secretariat has pressed its committees to develop programs and 
convene meetings concerning this “green growth” initiative. The CLPC 
devoted part of its October 2010 meeting to considerations of how competition 
policy might relate to the implementation of green growth strategies. The 
OECD secretariat’s push for committee participation in its horizontal 
initiatives could lead the CLPC to devote more time to matters with an 
attenuated connection with the competition policy responsibilities of its 
members. At some point, this allocation of effort could blur the identity of the 
CLPC and lead members to reconsider the intensity of their commitment to 
CLPC activities. OECD Work on Green Growth, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION 
AND DEV., http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3746,en_2649_37465_44076170
_1_1_1_37465,00.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
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among other consequences, has inspired calls for a relaxation of 
traditional antitrust controls on mergers and collaboration 
among competitors. This is but one area in which a network 
such as the ICN must devote some time to the treatment of 
pressing topical issues that arises at the boundaries of the 
competition policy system. 
A second factor that could blur the ICN’s competition-only 
focus is the diversity of policy tasks assigned to its members. A 
number of competition authorities are policy conglomerates: in 
addition to antitrust law, they enforce other statutes dealing 
with matters such as consumer protection and public 
procurement.83 Other systems assign the competition authority 
responsibility to proscribe “unfair competition”—a command 
straddles the doctrinal boundary between traditional 
competition law and the fields of business torts and contract 
law.84 Such measures focus attention on defining the 
boundaries of what forms of behavior “competition law” 
encompasses. Law enforcement within jurisdictions that apply 
these hybrid commands can create pressure for an expansion of 
what behavior falls within the concept of competition law.85 
The ICN’s membership also sets it apart from the other 
international networks that address competition policy. The 
member entities of the OECD, UNCTAD, and WTO are 
governments, and the competition agencies which participate 
in these networks speak as representatives of their respective 
governments—a condition that can require a competition 
agency to gain approval for its positions and initiatives from 
 
 83. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Form, Function, Performance, 
and the Assignment of Regulatory Duties: Toward a Theory of the Public 
Agency 44–50 (Feb. 2011) (manuscript on file with author Kovacic). 
 84. This is the case with Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 
which empowers the FTC to ban “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). Ambiguity about the 
reach of this measure is evident in the FTC’s settlement in N-Data (FTC 2007) 
which treated an episode of post-contractual reneging as an unfair method of 
competition and an unfair act or practice. FTC Challenges Patent Holder’s 
Refusal to Meet Commitment to License Patents Covering 'Ethernet' Standard 
Used in Virtually All Personal Computers in U.S., U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/01/ethernet.shtm (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). 
 85. The ICN’s custom is to allow the host of the network’s annual 
conference to place a topic of its choice on the meeting agenda. At the 2008 
conference in Kyoto, the Japan Fair Trade Commission convened a panel to 
discuss the application of statutes that, in the guise of competition law, 
restrict the exercise of an unfair bargaining advantage in contractual 
relations.  
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other ministries.86 Within the ICN, the member competition 
authorities have relatively greater freedom to express their 
views as antitrust bodies. There is less looking over the 
shoulder out of concern that the competition agency’s views 
might contradict the preferences of other public institutions 
within their governments. The ICN stands apart from its 
multinational network counterparts in the degree to which it 
engages non-government advisors (NGAs) in its work. 
Compared to its main international counterparts, the ICN 
relies more heavily upon the contributions of NGAs from 
academia, the business community, consumer groups, and the 
private bar.87 NGAs participate directly in the deliberations of 
the ICN’s working groups and in the network’s conferences and 
workshops; more than 100 NGAs attended ICN’s 2010 annual 
conference in Istanbul.88 NGA contributions have been 
indispensable to the accomplishments of some ICN projects—
such as the Merger Working Group—and it is doubtful that the 
network could function on such a large scale without extensive 
NGA participation.89 
To date, the principal contributions have been made by 
NGAs from the private sector. As noted above, this has raised 
questions within the ICN about whether the network ought to 
engage academics, consumer groups, and think tanks more 
fully in its program.90 A second issue about NGA participation 
is the selection process. For the most part, NGAs are 
 
 86. The discussion of competition law and trade policy provides an 
example. Suppose the CLPC schedules a roundtable on the impact of anti-
dumping mechanisms on domestic competition and asks members to submit 
papers on their national experiences. A competition agency will know that 
other major voices in government—especially those responsible for the 
execution of trade-related policy—will not look favorably upon a paper that 
documents how anti-dumping controls can shelter domestic firms from foreign 
competition and raise prices to domestic consumers. Because it appears on 
behalf of its government (and therefore must speak for a composite of 
departmental views), the agency is likely to either decline to provide a paper 
and thereby sidestep a controversial issue, or to write a watered-down paper 
that reflects the preferences of the government’s trade bodies.  
 87. See Fingleton Interview, supra note 3, at 74–5. 
 88. This is Kovacic’s rough count based on a comparison of the conference 
registration list and his observation of who attended the conference events. 
 89. See INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). As 
suggested earlier, perhaps the most influential contributions of NGAs have 
occurred in the Merger Working Group. 
 90. See Fingleton Interview, supra note 3, at 75. 
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nominated by their national competition authority (NCA).91 
This gives NCAs the ability to filter out prospective NGAs on 
various grounds unrelated to their expertise in competition 
law. For example, we are aware of instances in which it 
appears that a potential NGA has failed to gain approval from 
its NCA because the NCA believed the candidate had been 
insufficiently supportive of the NCA’s program.92 
Another distinguishing characteristic of the ICN is that it 
has strived to operate as a “virtual” network. The ICN neither 
employs a permanent staff (i.e., there is no counterpart to the 
OECD or UNCTAD secretariat) nor owns facilities to perform 
its managerial and organizational tasks. In this respect, the 
ICN has sought to separate itself from the OECD and 
UNCTAD, whose impressive physical headquarters house 
substantial permanent staffs.93 In place of a formal secretariat, 
ICN relies on its members to contribute the time of their staff, 
who form working groups in which NGAs also participate.94 
Most discussions within the working groups take place via 
teleconference and e-mail, with occasional face to face 
gatherings.95 One estimate by the Competition Directorate of 
the European Commission concluded that the ICN conducts 
90% of its work by email and teleconferencing.96 
Although the ICN sees itself as a virtual network, the 
demands it faces in organizing its affairs are real. As the 
 
 91. See Operational Framework, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about/operational-
framework.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2011) (outlining the NGA selection 
mechanism). 
 92. Kovacic has observed the NGA selection process closely by reason of 
his position as the ICN’s Vice-Chair for Outreach. 
 93. See e.g., supra note 35 and accompanying text for description of 
personnel and facilities of OECD. 
 94.  Some ICN members have contributed substantial time and personnel. 
Perhaps more than any other country, Canada has provided the closest 
approximation to a formal secretariat for the ICN. For example, Canada’s 
Competition Bureau has played a lead role in organizing the conference calls 
that supply a vital means for the deliberations of the ICN’s governing body, 
the Steering Committee. Canada has served this function both when heads of 
the Competition Bureau (Konrad von Finkenstein and Sheridan Scott) chaired 
the Steering Committee and when officials from other ICN members held this 
position. 
 95. For example, most meetings of the ICN Steering Group take place by 
telephone. The group also meets face-to-face at the ICN annual meeting and at 
the margins of the OECD CLPC meetings in February, June, and October. 
 96. See Chad Damro, The New Trade Politics and EU Competition Policy: 
Shopping for Convergence and Co-operation, 13 J. EUR. PUB POL’Y 867, 879 
(2006) (describing how the ICN conducts its work). 
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administrative and management tasks of the network increase, 
it is fair to ask whether this virtual system of organization—
which relies on the larger, better funded competition agencies 
to fulfill secretariat-like functions—will be adequate to support 
the ICN. There is reason to question whether the ICN can 
sustain a high level of activity without taking steps that 
establish a closer equivalent to a dedicated secretariat. 
The range and detailed work product that the ICN has 
developed in just under a decade is impressive—especially 
when you consider that all its participants have other day jobs. 
Achievements have been made in many areas, including 
merger review, anti-cartel enforcement, unilateral conduct, 
competition advocacy, and competition policy implementation.97 
Work product consists of recommended practices, case-handling 
and enforcement manuals, reports, legislation and rule 
templates, databases, toolkits, and workshops.98 At the most 
recent annual conference alone, the ICN issued, among other 
things, recommended practices for merger analysis on market 
definition and failing firms, a report on refusals to deal, and 
outlined plans for a virtual training program.99 
The ICN develops its work product in three stages.100 
Firstly, a steering group identifies an issue in need of study.101 
Next, a working group is established to study the issue and, 
through the course of that study, identifies the aspects of the 
issue that are suitable for convergence and sets out the best 
path to a more effective regulatory outcome.102 In the third 
stage, the ICN working group presents its findings, and ICN 
members begin to implement the suggested practices.103 To 
facilitate the adoption of suggested practices, the ICN develops 
templates, manuals and any other materials to assist 
implementation.104 
 
 97. See User Guide, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/vco%20toolkit%20int
roduction%20to%20icn%20april%202010%20complete.pdf (providing an 
introduction to the structure and work of the ICN). 
 98. See generally INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, supra note 89 (making 
the ICN work product freely available on their website). 
 99. ICN News Release: International Competition Network Plans for the 
Second Decade, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, http://www.internationalcompe
titionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc615.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 100. Sokol, supra note 33, at 111. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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Compliance with recommended procedural practices should 
be amenable to effective measurement. Routine monitoring of 
progress toward acceptance of what the ICN has identified as 
superior techniques is important to determine whether the 
network is fulfilling the objective that most strongly inspired 
its formation. Systematic comparisons between the ICN 
standards and individual national experience can enhance 
convergence as agencies become aware of differences between 
their procedures and consider what is working. A huge step 
forward involves enhancing the procedural best practices of 
competition agencies and to assist convergence by measuring 
progress. The fact that two or more countries have similar 
competition law systems, however, does not necessarily reduce 
the probability that each will account for different policy factors 
despite substantial similarity in their procedures.105 
As noted above, competition law is an inherently 
evolutionary field whose development depends heavily upon 
advances in learning in other academic disciplines, especially 
industrial organization economics.106 Today’s superior methods 
promise to be displaced by a continuous process of 
decentralized experimentation in which individual jurisdictions 
test specific approaches, evaluate results, and adopt 
refinements of existing substantive standards and 
procedures.107 For purposes of convergence, this requires a 
mechanism that entertains the testing of new techniques, 
facilitates the identification of improvements in the status quo, 
and thereby supplies a focal point for voluntary opting-in by 
individual jurisdictions.  
One possible means to this end is to improve the disclosure 
of agency information that illuminates the basis for agency 
decision making.108 By making the rationale for agency 
 
 105. For example, the adoption of common procedures for reporting 
proposed mergers would not ensure the refusal of competition agencies to 
consider policy factors unrelated to the maximizing of competition, such as the 
protection of what a nation perceives to be a strategic industry. 
 106. See generally William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A 
Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000) 
(examining the influence of developments in industrial organization economics 
on US competition law and policy). 
 107. See William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition 
Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 400–02, 472–76 (2003) 
(reviewing the evolutionary and experimental features of competition policy). 
 108. The development of a widely accepted methodology for reporting 
enforcement activity would provide a more informative perspective on the 
work of any single agency and would facilitate comparisons across 
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decisions more observable, we can test more accurately the 
extent of convergence upon the ICN’s suggested standards. 
Superior disclosure practices also will cast more light on subtle 
assumptions or shrouded policies that may drive agency 
decisions. Improving procedural practices, therefore, could spur 
greater convergence upon superior techniques in old and 
nascent competition law regimes, alike. 
In these and related endeavors, the ICN to this point has 
attracted considerable effort from its members, many of whom 
also participate in the OECD or UNCTAD, or both. Why do 
competition agencies around the world work arduously to 
develop recommended practices, toolkits, and other materials 
that are freely available to other agencies? Commentators have 
struggled with this question ever since the formation of the 
ICN and other so-called Transnational Regulatory Networks 
(TRNs) that involve specialized domestic officials directly 
interacting with each other, often with minimal supervision by 
foreign ministries.109 This question has also led them to express 
doubts about the ICN’s future.110 
One reason why the ICN has enjoyed success is the novelty 
of competition law for most nations.111 Since they are new to 
competition enforcement, new market-based systems are 
looking for guidance. Rote copying of another nation’s laws is 
not enough to establish an effective system of one’s own.112 
 
agencies. See William E. Kovacic, Hugh M. Hollman, & Patricia Grant, How 
Does Your Competition Agency Measure Up?, EUROPEAN COMP. J. (forthcoming 
2011). 
 109. Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: 
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA .J. 
INT’L L. 1, 1–7 (2002); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory 
Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 132–39 (2009). 
 110. See Lawson A.W. Hunter & Susan M. Hutton, Global Competition 
Initiative: A “Headless Horseman?”-and-the Canadian Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Guidelines: Convergence in Action (But Be Careful What You Ask 
For….), in CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & 
POLICY 25, 25 (Barry E. Hawk ed., Juris Publishing 2001); U.S. and Canadian 
Antitrust, inCORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & 
POLICY 45, 47–57 (Barry E. Hawk ed., Juris Publishing 2001). 
 111. See Kovacic, supra note 8, at 314–15. 
 112. An examination of the text of a statute says nothing about the process 
of interpretation and application that give meaning to the text’s operative 
terms. A first time reader of the Sherman Act might be inclined to think that 
the measure’s seemingly categorical ban on contracts in restraint of trade 
forbids any agreement that curbs the freedom of its parties. 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(2006). Since all contracts commit their parties to a course of action and 
breaches are punishable by damages, one could conclude that the Sherman 
Act bans all contracting. The text does not indicate that courts concluded that 
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Effective enforcement in any one system builds upon an 
accumulation of experience and knowhow. Instead, new 
agencies are striving to learn about the practical realities of 
antitrust enforcement and policy choices, which often are 
accessible through one’s own experimentation or through 
dialogue with more experienced agencies. The ICN provides a 
highly practical forum for discussion and the requested 
guidance.  
Another major advantage, especially for the more mature 
competition agencies, is cooperation among agencies and 
convergence in antitrust policy. Cooperation between agencies 
on cross-border cases reduces the risk of suboptimal 
enforcement where an agency otherwise is unable to obtain 
evidence from its counterpart competition authorities. Such 
cooperation also can diminish the number and degree of 
inconsistent outcomes when individual jurisdictions reach 
different conclusions about the same practice.113 As mentioned 
earlier, the concept of the ICN evolved directly from 
recommendations of the International Competition Advisory 
Committee that was formed in 1997 by then US Attorney 
General Janet Reno and Assistant Attorney General for the 
Antitrust Joel Klein—the same year that the McDonnell 
Douglas/Boeing case exposed a rift between the EU and US 
competition agencies.114 
III. INTERACTION WITH OTHER NETWORKS 
The ICN’s presence has had an important effect on the 
operation and management of other multinational networks. 
 
the prohibition applies only to agreements that unreasonably restrain trade. 
Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 106, at 44–53. 
 113. Greater cooperation—through information sharing and discussion of 
enforcement theories—reduces the likelihood of conflict by ensuring that 
agencies operate from the same basic body of factual assumptions and by 
facilitating a process through which conceptual concerns are examined and 
tested. 
 114. See FTC, [1997–2001 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24, 
295 (July 1, 1997) (closing the investigation into the Boeing/McDonnell 
Douglas merger but observing that “[t]here has been speculation in the press 
and elsewhere that the United States antitrust authorities might allow this 
transaction to go forward . . . and the United States . . . needs a single 
powerful firm to serve as its ‘national champion.’”). On July 30, 1997, the 
European Commission concluded that Boeing had a dominant position which 
would be strengthened by the merger but ended up clearing the merger on the 
basis of significant commitments by Boeing. Case IV/M.877, Boeing/McDonnell 
Douglas v. Commission, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16. 
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Its arrival in 2001 has helped inspire important elements of 
product repositioning by the OECD and UNCTAD. 
As suggested below,115 the ICN in many respects is a rival 
to the OECD and UNCTAD. The three networks resemble joint 
ventures that have largely overlapping, but not identical, 
ownership. The chief owners of each venture are identical—the 
relatively wealthy jurisdictions with well-staffed competition 
agencies and active enforcement programs.116 Like investors 
considering the content of their financial portfolios, these 
agencies decide each year about how to invest their foreign 
relations resources: to the ICN, OECD, or UNCTAD; to 
regional programs with competition policy components, such as 
ASEAN; to bilateral relationships with major commercial 
partners; or to technical assistance projects with less 
experienced competition authorities. The wealthy jurisdictions 
are the main source of commitments—such as attendance by 
top officials at regular network meetings, submission of high 
quality written contributions for policy discussions—that 
determine the success of each network’s programs.  
The decisions made by less wealthy jurisdictions also can 
be important. The multinational ventures exhibit network 
effects: their value to each member increases as the number of 
participants grows. By expanding attendance at regular 
functions and increasing the range of represented interests, 
broader participation by transition economies boosts the 
network’s attractiveness.117 Because poorer jurisdictions have 
fewer resources to commit to international matters, a decision 
to participate heavily in one network may mean that the 
agency ignores the others. 
To attract participation by wealthy and poorer countries 
alike, the multinational networks compete with each other to 
 
 115. See infra note 118 and accompanying text (describing how the ICN’s 
creation has affected programs of the OECD and UNCTAD). 
 116. Among the most noteworthy jurisdictions in this category are 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, EU, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, 
US, and the UK.  
 117. This is perhaps most evident in the case of transition economy 
jurisdictions that presently have large economies or are experiencing growth 
rates that are rapidly increasing their economic significance. Such countries 
have acquired, or soon will attain, considerable ability to influence cross-
border commerce through the implementation of their own competition laws. 
For example, the ICN would be considerably weaker if India and South Africa, 
both of which have substantial economies and important competition regimes, 
were not members. For the same reason, the ICN attaches great importance to 
seeing China join the network.  
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provide a more attractive bundle of services. The rivalry among 
the networks at times has been intense. The establishment of 
the ICN drew scorn from some the OECD and UNCTAD 
officials, some of whom lobbied their constituencies to forego 
participation in the ICN.118 The entry of the ICN into the 
international network market also caused the OECD and 
UNCTAD to change their product offerings. In both groups, one 
observed a higher tempo of work and stronger efforts to ensure 
that new programs reflected the preferences of members. Both 
groups became more demand driven—a positive outcome of new 
entry. The initial period of relatively acute rivalry has abated, 
and the three organizations have taken initial steps toward a 
division of labor that recognizes complementary aspects of their 
programs and deemphasizes possibilities for substitution 
among them.  
A. CONVERGENCE POSSIBILITIES, SHORTCOMINGS & SOLUTIONS 
It is useful to consider how much the ICN’s convergence-
related initiatives, as well as the contributions of other 
multinational networks, will reduce conflicts among 
jurisdictions with respect to the treatment of specific matters. 
We would expect broad, voluntary opting in to substantive and 
procedural standards to decrease conflicts. Widespread 
adoption of similar analytical methods and procedures should 
serve in many instances to guide competition agencies in 
matters to the same result. At the same time, it is hard to 
imagine that convergence inspired by the ICN or other 
multinational networks will suffice to eliminate transnational 
conflicts. Jurisdictions with similar competition regimes, 
shared analytical methods, and consistent procedures 
sometimes will reach different outcomes owing to variations in 
application.  
Even with apparent success in promoting convergence, the 
certainty of future conflicts raises the question of whether the 
discussion about global competition policy should include 
consideration of a binding international antitrust dispute 
 
 118. Kovacic recalls the atmosphere at the OECD’s October 2001 meeting, 
which followed shortly after the ICN’s launch earlier that month. Key officials 
in the CLPC leadership and secretariat expressed deep concern that the ICN 
would undermine the OECD by diverting the attention of OECD members 
away from the CLPC and by discouraging nonmembers from participating in 
OECD outreach events. 
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resolution mechanism.119 As Louis Sohn and other 
international law scholars have observed, voluntary 
cooperation and voluntary acceptance of recommended 
practices can supply a foundation for the establishment of 
binding, treaty-based obligations.120 The ICN might define its 
role as facilitating convergence among competition law systems 
as a necessary evolutionary step from soft law to hard law—
towards the formation of a multinational competition law 
agreement with binding provisions. 
The concept that soft law evolves into hard law has logical 
appeal. Global problems would seem to require global 
solutions.121 An agreement could reduce the risk of 
jurisdictional conflict and resolve conflicts that arise.122 In 
addition, without an agreement, states’ interests will not align 
sufficiently to resolve conflicts that arise.123 
The concept of a multinational agreement has attracted 
considerable attention from policymakers, practitioners, and 
scholars throughout the period since World War II.124 
Consideration of a framework of international competition law 
has taken place in a number of fora, including the United 
Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
the WTO, the OECD, and UNCTAD.125 Despite these 
discussions, no international treaty on competition issues has 
been signed. There are bilateral and regional agreements but, 
despite numerous attempts, no binding multilateral agreement. 
While countries often agree on the idea of a multinational 
competition agreement, the ultimate lack of success in actually 
 
 119. See Wood, supra note 53, at286–87 (demonstrating the non-binding 
nature of the UN Set as one reason for the Set’s failure to become the 
international competition code that its creators envisioned). 
 120. Louis Sohn believed progress toward international agreement 
proceeded in small, incremental steps and depended on a long-term process of 
engagement. Thomas Buergenthal, Note, Louis B. Sohn (1914–2006), 100 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 623, 625–26 (2006). 
 121. See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, 
Down, and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781, 1785–86 (2000) (stating nations 
have considered transnational rules in light of growing international trade). 
 122. See generally Andrew Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501 (1998) (advocating for an international agreement on 
antitrust issues, even though it is unlikely such an agreement could occur). 
 123. See Robert D. Anderson & Frédéric Jenny, Current Developments in 
Competition Policy in the World Trade Organization, 16 ANTITRUST 40, 41 
(2001) (articulating that antitrust conflicts will continue to arise and that 
there will be difficulty resolving these issues because of national interests). 
 124. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 53. 
 125. ICPAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 255–71. 
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forming a multinational agreement has often had more to do 
with geopolitical factors and timing than countries disagreeing 
with the need for a multinational agreement. 
1. Earlier Attempts at a Global Competition Law 
Early attempts at forming a global competition law focused 
primarily on eliminating the harms of international cartels 
that were prevalent during the early 20th century.126 
Transnational cartelization developed in waves in response to 
two major destabilizing events in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. The “Great Depression” of the 1870s and 1880s led to 
first wave of cartelization.127 The second wave followed the 
Great War that had taken its toll on the European economies 
by reducing production levels, incomes and living standards.128 
In the midst of this economic uncertainty, businesses sought to 
reduce their risk levels by agreeing with their competitors or 
potential competitors to coordinate their production or prices.129 
At the time, cartels were not perceived as necessarily damaging 
to consumer welfare. To the contrary, they were considered as a 
useful mechanism for achieving a more effective international 
order by rationalizing economic development, reducing 
overproduction, and improving the stability of workers’ jobs.130 
International cartelization was a prominent issue at the 
World Economic Conference of May 1927, an event that 
attracted representatives from fifty countries.131 While the 
objective of the conference was to identify and remove obstacles 
to international trade, such as tariffs, the most recent wave of 
cartelization following the Great War led to widespread debate 
about the issue of cartelization.132 Discussions regarding cartels 
turned out to be the most contentious of the conference.133 This 
led to difficulty in drafting language and delays in generating 
 
 126. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 24. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 23. 
 130. Diane P. Wood, Cooperation and Convergence in International 
Antitrust: Why the Light Is Still Yellow, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: 
ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 177, 178 (Richard A. 
Epsten& Michael S. Greve eds., 2004). 
 131. MARTIN HILL, THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS 47 (1946). 
 132. The Conference commissioned seven reports that dealt specifically 
with cartels. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 27 n.23. 
 133. Id. at 30 & n.37. 
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recommendations on the cartel issue. 
At the time, European experience with antitrust and 
cartels was limited.134 Germany was the only major European 
country that had significant competition law experience.135 The 
US had the most experience at the domestic level and had an 
outright ban on cartel agreements.136 Nonetheless, the US 
influence was limited as it was not a member of the League of 
Nations, and US representatives only participated at the 
Conference as observers.137 Many at the Conference disfavored 
the US approach of outright prohibition.138 Moreover, 
Europeans tended to view the US antitrust system as an ill-
considered system in that it allowed industrial concentration 
and encouraged mergers despite its prohibition of competition 
restraints.139 Much of the generally negative view of 
competition law centered on a general lack of confidence in 
government, which colored the assessment of anti-cartel 
proposals.140 
The Conference’s final recommendation on cartels did not 
establish an international competition law or supervisory 
mechanism for international cartels.141 The Official Report 
described the establishment of an international judicial regime 
for cartels as impossible due to divergences in enforcement 
between countries and general objections to such a system, but 
the Conference did call for the League to collect information on 
international cartels, investigate their consequences and 
publish information on harmful effects.142 Despite failing to 
formalize a response to cartels, this development was a major 
first step toward an international response to issues presented 
by a global economy.143 
The economic crash of 1929 sent many of the world’s 
economies into a downward spiral. The global depression 
seemed to discredit reliance upon market processes and 
discouraged consideration of mechanisms—such as competition 
 
 134. Id. at 36. 
 135. Id; see generally DAVID J. GERBER, PROMETHEUS BOUND 266–333 
(2001) (analyzing development of Germany’s competition policy system). 
 136. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 27, 35. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 35. 
 139. Id. at 35–6. 
 140. Id. at 36. 
 141. Id. at 30. 
 142. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 30. 
 143. Id. at 37–8. 
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law—associated with market-oriented economic policy. 
Countries were less inclined to consider cooperative global 
solutions, as evidenced by US initiatives during the Great 
Depression.144 This was confirmed when the US increased its 
tariffs in 1930, which led to many other countries following suit 
and further contributed to the Great Depression.145 
Nonetheless, following the 1927 League of Nations conference, 
there was another international effort to promote global 
competition law at the 27th Conference of the Inter-
Parliamentary Union in 1930.146 This organization was founded 
on a cosmopolitan faith that governments working together 
could improve the human condition.147 The delegates called for 
states to develop a set of enforceable international competition 
law principles.148 This was likely the last initiative to develop 
an international competition law before the Great Depression 
and Second World War put an end to cooperative international 
solutions.149 
2. The Havana Chapter 
Apart from being major destabilizing events, the Great 
Depression and Second World War demonstrated the power of 
big government. In the US, the government played an active 
role in righting the capsized economy and its role significantly 
increased during the New Deal. The massive government-
directed mobilization during the Second World War also 
demonstrated both the power and capability of government 
institutions. The expansion of the state’s role in the economy 
also drew strength from scholars, such as John Maynard 
Keynes, who challenged concepts of neoclassical economics that 
favored relatively free markets to solve unemployment in favor 
of more active government intervention in the economy through 
fiscal policy.150 The increased role of government and the 
 
 144. Detlev F. Vagts, International Economic Law and the American 
Journal of International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 769, 775 (2006). 
 145. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 38. US domestic economic 
policy from 1933 through 1935 also favored measures, such as the efforts 
undertaken by the National Recovery Administration to set industry wide 
codes that suppressed rivalry, that suppressed competition. See ELLIS W. 
HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966). 
 146. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 38. 
 147. Id. at 38 & n.58. 
 148. Id. at 38. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. The expansion in the United States of intervention by the 
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increase in forces that transcended national barriers seemed to 
call for governments to cooperate to form global solutions. 
With this mindset the US and its allies conceived the 
Bretton Woods program during the Second World War. The 
program built upon a system of new international institutions 
that would provide a framework for the global economy once 
the war ended.151 These institutions included the formation of 
what would become the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).152 Also part of the discussions at 
Bretton Woods were plans to create an international body to 
improve commercial relations and foster the reconstruction of 
global trade that had suffered during the Great Depression and 
Second World War. The resulting institution, created by the so-
called Havana Charter, was the International Trade 
Organization (ITO).153 
As part of the Bretton Woods program, the US circulated a 
draft proposal for an international trade organization.154 The 
proposal suggested that countries should “join in an effort to 
release trade from the various restrictions which have kept it 
small. If they succeed in this they will have made a major 
contribution to the welfare of their peoples and to the success of 
their common efforts in other fields.”155 There were two parts to 
the proposal. The first was a collection of principles to 
constitute a government code of conduct that focused on four 
areas: government interference with trade (e.g., tariffs and 
quotas), cartels, government commodity agreements, and 
national treatment of foreign investment.156 Going further than 
just setting forth a set of principles, the second part of the plan 
contemplated the establishment of an international 
organization to enforce those principles.157 
In response to the US proposal, the UN Economic and 
Social Council created a committee consisting of seventeen 
 
government in the economy is documented in ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND 
LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 
(1987). 
 151. See generally Vagts, supra note 144, at 774–76. 
 152. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS 
REGULATION 97–98 (2000). 
 153. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24, 
1948, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/havana.pdf. 
 154. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 126, at 43. 
 155. Id. at 44 n.66. 
 156. Id. at 44. 
 157. Id. 
KOVACIC - Final Version 4/22/20116:19 PM 
2011] THE ICN: ITS PAST, CURRENT, AND FUTURE ROLE 317 
 
members that included more “underdeveloped” countries to 
discuss and develop the US proposal.158 Despite the lack of 
participation by the Soviet Union and the many concessions 
made to the developing countries,159 the committee prepared a 
draft. This led to a meeting in Havana in 1948 where the final 
agreement was to be negotiated. Fifty-seven countries attended 
the conference, and fifty-three countries ended up signing the 
so-called Havana Charter in March, 1948.160 This was the last 
piece of a major project to further develop several existing 
international organizations.161 Most countries waited for the 
US to ratify the convention before doing so themselves.162 They 
considered the US as essential to the success of the ITO, 
without whose contribution the ITO would be an empty shell.163 
The US Congress was responsible for taking the next step 
on the way to establish the ITO because Congress would have 
to ratify the agreement to authorize the US to participate.164 In 
April 1949, President Truman submitted the Charter to 
Congress for its approval.165 By 1949, however, the political 
climate, which had led to the establishment of the other 
organizations conceived in the Bretton Woods program, had 
changed. On the eve of a new decade, many believed that the 
clash in political ideologies between the Soviet Union and US 
would dominate foreign relations. Along these lines, the Soviet 
Union was ideologically opposed to the capitalist ITO.166 As a 
result, it appeared that fewer nations than originally hoped 
would participate in the ITO. With this in mind, it seemed to 
make little sense for the US to subject itself to the jurisdiction 
of an international organization if it were not to realize the 
 
 158. The members of the committee were Australia, Belgium-Luxembourg 
Economic Union, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, 
India, Lebanon, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Union of South Africa, 
Soviet Union, UK, and US. Id. at 44 n.68. See generally PETER VAN DEN 
BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 79 
(2005).  
 159. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 126, at 44 n.68, 45. 
 160. See WILLIAM A. BROWN, JR., THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE 10 (1950). 
 161. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 152, at 97–98. 
 162. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 46. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See generally William Diebold, Jr., The End of the ITO, in 16 ESSAYS 
IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 1, 1–37 (1952). 
 165. See BROWN, supra note 160, at 10. 
 166. GLOBAL COMPETITION, supra note 70, at 46. 
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benefits of a wide membership.167 
US domestic politics had also changed significantly. In 
1946, the Republican Party gained control of the Congress for 
the first time since Franklin Roosevelt’s election in 1932.168 
Protectionist Republicans generally took a skeptical view of 
core elements of the Democratic Party’s foreign policy 
program.169 In 1948, the Democrats retook the Congress by a 
thin, insecure majority. The following year, China became a 
communist state under Mao Tse Tung’s leadership.170 This 
development, along with the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950 and continuing struggles with the Soviet Union, 
reinforced the containment of communism as the chief foreign 
policy priority of the US.171 
Owing to these and other changes in the United States and 
abroad, Wilsonian ideals of international collaboration, which 
had underpinned the development of post-war international 
organizations, appeared out of step with an increasingly 
divided world—especially a world divided between the 
ideological poles of capitalism and communism. The Truman 
administration realized that Congress would not accept the 
ITO proposal, and it withdrew the measure from consideration 
December 1950.172 No significant attempt to establish an 
international competition law would take place until four 
decades later.173 
The Havana Charter episode is often cited as an example of 
the rejection of international competition law by the United 
States and the rest of the world. Judge Diane Wood has 
observed that the US objected to the Havana Charter because 
its antitrust rules “were not adequate for the US, and that the 
rest of the world was not yet ready to embrace a serious 
antitrust regime.”174 Although a global competition law 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 47. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See SUSAN ARIEL AARONSON, TRADE AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: A 
SOCIAL HISTORY OF POSTWAR TRADE POLICY 5, 130 (1996). 
 173. Professor Susan Aaronson’s research about the ITO negotiations 
attributes the ITO’s demise to “changing international circumstances, party 
politics, special-interest opposition, and Truman Administration ambivalence.” 
Id. at 5. 
 174. Diane P. Wood, The Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for 
the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289, 1296 (1994–95). 
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appeared inappropriate for a world divided between the 
ideologies of communism and capitalism, nations with market-
based economies were favorably disposed to the concept. 
Nonetheless, the development of two separate systems of 
economic activity—one based on markets and the other with 
the state as the principal actor—led to the abandonment of 
efforts to develop a multilateral framework for global 
competition. It was only with the fall of the Soviet Union in 
1991 that the vision of an international competition law 
seemed possible once again as more countries began to 
participate in the global market. 
3. ICN: Possible Foundation for International Rules 
Past attempts to develop a multilateral competition law 
agreement have failed because they were premature in the 
sense that only a relative minority of the world’s nations relied 
heavily on market-based economic systems, and still fewer of 
these had established competition systems. The widespread 
acceptance of market processes and the creation of competition 
laws in nearly 120 countries represents an important change in 
the enabling conditions for a global system of antitrust rules.175 
As we have discussed elsewhere, the wide acceptance of 
competition policy substantive standards, procedures, and 
institutions seems to occur in three stages: decentralized 
experimentation within individual jurisdictions, identification 
of best practices or techniques, and voluntarily opting in to 
superior norms by individual jurisdictions.176 It is only now 
with the continuing acceptance of the ICN’s best practices and 
policies, along with those of the OECD and UNCTAD, that 
countries are beginning to consider the transition from the 
second to third stage: opting in to superior norms.177 The 
developing world’s suspicion that competition law is simply 
another means for the developed world to achieve its own 
global economic aims may be dissipating. Transition economies 
appear to have greater confidence that competition agencies, 
working through multinational organizations, can identify, 
adopt, and apply superior competition law norms in ways that 
promote economic development.  
 
 175. Wood, supra note 130, at 178. 
 176. William E. Kovacic, Extraterritoriality, Institutions, and Convergence 
in International Competition Policy, 97 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 309, 311 
(2003). 
 177.  See, e.g., STATEMENT OF ACHIEVEMENTS, supra note 6. 
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With gradual acceptance of the view that there are 
superior practices concerning the substance, process, and 
administration of competition law, there is an increased 
likelihood that countries may decide to opt into a multilateral 
agreement to achieve the benefits associated with a global 
agreement on widely accepted principles. As before, the 
ultimate question is whether the world has arrived at that 
point. Is there a set of competition norms and best practices 
that are globally accepted and may supply the basis for an 
international agreement on competition law?  
The ICN, OECD, and UNCTAD appear to have increased 
convergence around competition law norms and practices, and 
they have capacity to make further progress in the future. Of 
the three, the ICN may prove to be the most effective 
convergence vehicle. This possibility stems from the breadth of 
its membership (an advantage over the OECD), its members’ 
status as agencies rather than governments (an advantage over 
the OECD and UNCTAD), and its greater emphasis on 
practically-oriented projects to identify and embody consensus 
views in the form of recommended practices and related norms 
(an advantage over the OECD and UNCTAD). The ICN’s 
leadership also has developed a more complete vision of how 
convergence might unfold. By thinking more systematically 
about convergence and making convergence the network’s chief 
priority, the ICN is better positioned to focus its resources on 
achieving this end. 
We would imagine that the ICN best practices and related 
recommendations can serve as a precursor for future steps to 
convert voluntarily adopted standards into binding 
commitments. The establishment of universal substantive 
commands could take place in a stepwise manner, beginning 
with prohibitions on cartels. We also would expect that the ICN 
network can continue to serve as a vehicle, in addition to the 
work of the OECD and UNCTAD, for developing consensus 
positions that become the platform for a progression that 
begins with voluntary opting in and may extend to binding 
commitments.  
IV. CONCLUSION: ICN IN ITS SECOND DECADE 
We close by emphasizing what we see to be three major 
focal points for the ICN in the coming decade. The first is to 
build on its past successes and continue to pursue the 
identification and adoption of best practices with respect to 
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substantive standards, procedures, and the administration of 
competition agencies. We envision expanded efforts to evaluate 
the degree of convergence in practice around the ICN’s 
competition law norms and standards established by the OECD 
and UNCTAD.178 The ICN’s recommendations are not binding; 
no member country is obliged to adopt an ICN 
recommendation. It is often unclear how much ICN members 
are complying with its recommendations in practice. The 
OECD and UNCTAD conduct voluntary peer reviews to provide 
a more objective evaluation of various competition agencies.179 
These reviews are valuable, but their findings sometimes 
downplay particularly controversial issues lest countries 
conclude that participation in a review will expose them to 
excessively damaging criticism. The Global Competition Review 
also has a ranking system but its methodology seems to be 
largely based on the level of activity of each agency, and not 
application and acceptance of competition law best practices.180 
Possibly a better approach for encouraging convergence is 
to build upon reputational and peer pressure. Nations could be 
grouped depending on which competition norms they have 
opted to apply in their competition law regimes. This might be 
extended to include a form of nonbinding arbitration in which 
panels consisting of representatives of competition agencies 
offer opinions on disputes brought before them. The 
continuation of contacts facilitated by the ICN, its working 
groups, its workshops, conferences, and annual meeting, helps 
build the level of trust and understanding that is necessary for 
countries to commit themselves to participate in this or similar 
forms of dispute resolution. 
It may also be possible to rank the competition law regimes 
according to the norms they apply and their success in actually 
putting them into effect. The exact mechanism could vary but 
the goal should be to establish an objective means to evaluate 
competition agencies. Measurement efforts also might advance 
 
 178. The importance of evaluation as way to assess international 
organizations’ effectiveness, specifically for developing countries, has been 
emphasized in Helen V. Milner, Globalization, Development, and International 
Institutions: Normative and Positive Perspectives, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 833, 848–
49 (2005). 
 179. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text (discussing OECD and 
UNCTAD peer reviews). 
 180. Rating Enforcement, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., available at 
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/surveys/survey/376/Rating-Enforcem
ent/. 
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by the promulgation, through the ICN, of common data 
reporting methods by which competition authorities would 
classify and disclose information about the prosecution and 
resolution of cases. Only through such objective evaluation will 
it become clear the extent to which jurisdictions are converging 
around a set of competition norms and processes; it will also 
assist in identifying exactly which norms and processes are 
considered best practices and those that are actually being 
applied. If convergence is evident, then the next attempt at a 
multilateral agreement on those principles and processes will 
face much greater prospects for success than it has in the past. 
A second desirable focal point for future ICN efforts is to 
identify and make use of complementarities with the OECD 
and UNCTAD. This should begin with an exercise that takes 
stock of the characteristics and capabilities of all three 
institutions and maps out areas of existing and potential 
complementarity. This will provide a basis for the networks to 
identify areas in which collaboration will improve their 
collective effectiveness. The networks might strive to see how 
the vast reservoirs of knowledge accumulated within OECD 
and UNCTAD, embodied in reports, studies, and the experience 
of the secretariats of these bodies, can be applied by all three 
networks in the formulation of standards and the sharing of 
knowhow across competition agencies. We see great advantages 
from greater integration of effort, and we see dangers if such 
integration is not forthcoming. Amid enormous pressures for 
governments and their competition agencies to reduce costs, a 
failure to increase the realization of complementarities could 
lead to the demise or contraction competition programs within 
one or more of the existing networks. 
The third frontier of future work is to examine and refine 
the ICN’s operational framework and determine whether its 
structure and operational forms are adequate to support its 
current and future programs. ICN’s founders correctly 
perceived that the modern revolution in communications 
technology would permit ICN to operate effectively without the 
outlays for bricks and mortar and an elaborate secretariat that 
supported the establishment and growth of OECD and 
UNCTAD.181 In a rough sense, ICN has formed the public 
 
 181. See Kai Raustiala, The Rise of Transnational Networks Conference, 43 
INT’L LAWYER 205, 207 (2009) (discussing the role of new communications 
technology in spurring the development of modern transnational networks of 
economic regulatory agencies).  
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administration equivalent of the e-commerce business model 
that has enabled modern companies to leapfrog traditional 
brick and mortar distribution systems.  
We salute the ICN’s inventiveness in building a strong 
substantive program and realizing the possibilities for 
innovation in the design and operation of a modern 
international network of public agencies. We also see the major 
administrative challenges that lie ahead. The absence of highly 
visible physical facilities and a larger permanent secretariat, 
coupled with the much professed commitment to maintain a 
virtual existence, has masked the full dimensions of the 
demands associated with the ICN’s operations. The ICN 
network may be virtual, but the problems of resources, 
financing, and management are unmistakably real. This is 
especially so for an organization whose continued success will 
require it to undertake still more ambitious programs, and 
whose past achievements have raised expectations for future 
accomplishment. 
ICN’s tenth anniversary will be a good occasion to take 
stock of what the operation of the network costs today and is 
likely to cost in the future. This exercise will identify the 
magnitude and sources of effort—by ICN members and NGAs—
that sustain the network today and will be needed for it to 
carry out its plans for the future. The quality of this mundane 
budgeting and planning exercise will be no less important to 
the ICN’s second decade than its wise selection and 
implementation of a substantive agenda. 
 
